[Indonesia] A Make-believe Nation"

[Hombre de Maiz]

Ethnically, racially and religiously, there is nothing out of the ordinary among the Acehnese with regards to their national and international neighbors. Linguistically they are a bit different in that their language has more in common with the Chamic languages of Vietman than to other Austronesian languages on Sumatra, but that is a minute difference. The social and political differences among the Acehnese, I think, can be attributed to the following:
i.) Aceh was an independent polity centuries before anyone even coined the term Indonesia.
ii.) Aceh is likely the earliest Islamized places in the archipelago, and after the fall of Melaka, it prided itself on being the regional standard bearer of Islam and resistance to outsiders.
iii.) Aceh's independence was truncated by a bloody set of colonial wars against the Dutch (and Portuguese) over the a period of thirty years which heightened a complex of defiance and resistance to outsiders.
iv.) During the wars of independence, Aceh underwent the most profound social transformation of any territory that would later become Indonesia. This internal civil was saw the complete overturning of the colonial order and of the nobility, leaving the religious authorities in a position of ascendancy. Aceh has in Tengku diTiro one of the most defiant and uncompromising independence leaders in Indonesia. Social revolution and independence in aceh are one and the same, and they are both tied to the ulama and religion.
v.) Disappointment with and suppression by Jakarta. Relations with Jakarta degenerated almost as soon as Indonesia gained independence. Some of the biggest massacres perpetrated against Aceh by Jakarta were during the days of Sukarno. This fed to a complex of betrayal, and fed the sense of grievance and defiance against outsiders.
vi.) Hasan diTiro, the Tengku's grandson and the founder of GAM, articulated and propagated a concept of the Aceh nation. In terms of articulating a new nation, Sukarno had nothing on diTiro.
vii.) A long, protracted and brutal war against Indonesia which raged from 1976 till 2006, with some of the bloodiest episodes taking place under Megawati.

Aceh is a product of its history, one that is almost without parallel anywhere else in the archipelago.

The single one best source to understand Aceh and its conflict with Indonesia is Anthony Reid's edited volume, Verandah of Violence (a play on words. Aceh is known as the Verandah to Mecca).

[jstar]

Here's the introduction to a text on Aceh that I wrote several months ago:

....... So common were these desperate, violent acts of resistance—historians estimate that suicidal attacks on the Dutch took place on average once a week until the early 1930s—against an unjust order that it spawned a new term among the ghastly nomenclature of colonial violence, the Aceh-moord. .......

With the word moord (murder) being Dutch: besides people like Anthony Reid no (Dutch) historian acknowledges this frequency. These are the recorded numbers: 75 murders between 1910-1920, 51 between 1920-1930, 28 between 1930-1940. Hardly one per week; it seems a bit like spicing up the numbers....

Anyway, this Multatuli quote in his book Max Havelaar describes the Dutch behavior which demonstrates why the resistance was so strong: "a village that had just been captured by the Dutch, so it was on fire.".

And some milestones (=euphemisms) used by the Dutch government about the situation in Nederlands Indië (sorry for my lousy translation):

1894: The Rajah of Lombok is "brought to reason '
1896: In Aceh 'the pacification has begun' (chasing Teuku Umar)
1901: On Jambi ", the extension of our authority has begun"
1903: On Korintji " action with weapons has occurred "
1905: On Borneo "a long lasting battle has ended "
1905: Celebes "is brought completely under direct control"
1906: On Bali "our power is properly confirmed"
1908: On the Aru islands "the limits of our expanded government are significantly broadened"
1910: On Halma Heira "the situation is put to order"
etc.

Just to show Atjeh was not an exception...

[Hombre de Maiz]

Perhaps, but as with Staat, it changes not an iota of the substance.

[jstar]

Perhaps, but as with Staat, it changes not an iota of the substance.

Good arguments Hombre, always nice to debate with you. Anyway, as with Staat, check your sources next time.

[Hombre de Maiz]

I do not profess to know any Germanic language but English so I can be excused for confusing, on the fly and away from my library, the words staat and stadt. Lest it be lost in the the fastidious nitpicking, the point of that statement was to highlight that novelty of the census, statistics and its European origin. Btw, I can recommend a good pair of headphones.

[jstar]

I do not profess to know any Germanic language but English so I can be excused for confusing, on the fly and away from my library, the words staat and stadt. Lest it be lost in the the fastidious nitpicking, the point of that statement was to highlight that novelty of the census, statistics and its European origin. Btw, I can recommend a good pair of headphones.

If and when you use certain arguments, you should not kick them in the long grass whenever someone proves those arguments wrong. Then it always becomes in your arguing: but that's not the point...

Well, yes it is the point when the arguments are not valid anymore, then you build your whole case on quicksand. So returning to those 2 examples: in the other post you made a big thing out of the 'fact' census/statistics were based on city populations. And above your explanation for the exceptional situation of Aceh states a major factor was the relationship with the colonizers.

But hey, that's not the point.

[Hombre de Maiz]

My point about the Acehnese stands whether it was 7, 17 or 70 murders a week. My point about labels to describe human groups stands whether the word statistics comes from the moon or from mars. You have not altered or added anything of significance.

[Nimbus]

Is it so hard to simply admit your mistake and move on, instead of protesting the corrective post as out-of-topic? Nobody minds a little diversion here and there, except when it becomes hostile and uncivilized.

[ponyexpress]

The students opposed KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) which came to define Suharto's regime in the 90's. these nefarious practices were seen as the cause of the economic meltdown. Most Indonesians didn't have a problem with Suharto's questionable actions when we were relatively prosperous. But, since many people were hurt economically by the economic crisis, we'd be damned if we let him continue with those practices. Suharto was completely insensitive of the situation and gave his crony "Bob" Hasan and his daughter "Tutut" Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana cabinet positions in 1998. That was the last straw.

An authoritarian and centralized government was not automatically seen as bad, but one where corruption, collusion, and nepotism rule certainly was.

The official salary of Indonesian army officers is just as low as that of their civilian counterparts. The only officers not involved in any 'irregularity' was the ones posted to 'dry' sectors like army command school and such. The fact that Suharto was reprimanded could mean he was doing it to excess, or somebody at the top just didn't like him.

I read a book about somebody's account of his years as a 'tentara pelajar' (student-soldier) in central and east java during the wars of independence. He described regularly conducted transactions between Dutch occupied territories and republican ones. In the beginning trucks would pull up to the demarcation line, exchanging weapons, ammo, and medical supplies for rice and other food produce. Later on they even streamlined the process by using trains. Conducting business transactions with the enemy couldn't be legitimate, but it was done anyway, surely with implicit approval from army command.

Suharto was viewed as the father of Indonesian development. Had he resigned in 1988 he would have been remembered as a national hero. Instead he stayed on to pave the way to power and wealth for his kids. People had always known about his KKN practices, but these didn't become excessive and overshadow his accomplishments until the 90's.

Yes, of course. The parents of (and alleged) thugs who were murdered in the 80s didn't complain at all about Suharto's approach. The families and friends of those who were killed during the Lampung and Priok tragedies agreed with Suharto's coercive approach. Oh not to mention all of the alleged communists and followers too. They were jubilant with their uncertain incarceration. How about some of Megawati's followers who went missing after their head-office was raided in 1996?

The people who didn't complain were mostly perhaps the middle classes born out of the oil boom. These middle classes lauded Suharto and his development program until they’ve got affected by the economic upheaval in 1997. In response, they had a sulk and spilt on to the street.

The history of opposition to corruption dates back to the early period of the New Order. Although there was no significance resistance from the society in term of its scale and social participation, the issue of corruption still overshadowed the performance of the new government and challenged their promises to deliver a fair and open administration. Five years after its installment, the Suharto government faced a fierce opposition from young middle classes comprising journalists, lawyers and students who censured Tien’s Suharto’s plan to build the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park. The project was deemed ambitious and a waste of state’s fund. Residents who lived in the area designated for the project were forced to sell their lands for less than half of the market value (Hitchcock, 2009). This political dissidence did nothing to hinder the project as the authority quickly quelled these activists.

The calamity in 1977, following the visit of the Japanese prime minister was arguably a turning point for the New Order to strengthen its control over society. Not long after this calamity, the students' campaign against corruption was shut down by the Normalisation of Campus Life Policy. The attempt of depoliticising campuses was parallel with the marginalisation of the New Order’s last-standing political opponents coming from political parties, Masyumi and PSI. Both parties were blamed for instigating the riot and their leaders were arrested. After this era, the New Order tightened its grip over Indonesians political life. As a result, the Suharto government became intolerant with criticism and this was shown in its attitude towards press coverage of his style of leadership and administration. Running parallel to this, the sharp increase in oil prices, which enhanced the economic performance, meant that the Suharto’s government could distract the middle classes from expressing defiance and disillusionment towards a substantial controlled of political life (Aspinall, 2000).

The inclusion of the Indonesian military into the administration underpinned the Suharto authoritarian style of leadership. During his tenure, Suharto often used the Indonesian military to thwart his political opponents or social resistance. The role of the military was evident in Suharto's attempt to overthrow Megawati after she was elected as the leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1996. Although Suharto's alliance with the military was rather disrupted in the 1980s largely due to the increasingly popular figure of Jusuf and Moerdany amongst their ranks, their removal was meant to secure support from his reliable institution. When the students prostests' broke out in 1998, the repeal of dual function policy was amongst other themes raised under their campaign against corruption, collusion and nepotism.

If you’re saying that most Indonesians didn’t have any problem with Suharto’s questionable actions, then you are probably talking about your circle (the middle classes who enjoyed the wealth deriving from the oil boom) rather than the ‘majority’ of Indonesians. As we all know that you are an Indonesian, it's fair for us to expect something more carefully thought out view on Indonesian history rather than a broad brush generalisation.

[Hombre de Maiz]

Hasn't it been traditionally the brutal and callous calculus of the extreme right, in Indonesia and farther afield (Latin America, for example), to put on one side of the scale the body-bags, corruption, repression and abuse of power and on the other, the economic growth and a stability derived from the boot on the head? I'll trade you 20 summary executions for half a percentage point of GDP growth. Two hundred political prisoners and "disappeared" for a $1 million in foreign investment...